Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

9-3-2015

State v. Smith, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 63 (Sept. 3, 2015)
Jessie Vargas
Nevada Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Vargas, Jessie, "State v. Smith, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 63 (Sept. 3, 2015)" (2015). Nevada Supreme Court
Summaries. 917.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/917

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

State v. Smith, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 63 (Sept. 3, 2015)1
CRIMINAL LAW: INVOLUNTARY PLEA
Summary
Defendant Terrance Reed Smith entered a no contest plea to one count of child abuse
resulting in substantial bodily harm. The Supreme Court of Nevada held Smith’s plea was
involuntary because the plea was made in response to acts of coercion by the Washoe County
Department of Social Services (“DDS”).
Background
Smith was alleged to have committed an act of child abuse upon his infant daughter. DDS
sought and obtained custody of Smith’s daughter and placed her in foster care. DDS indicated it
would consent to returning physical and legal custody of Smith’s daughter to his wife, on the
condition that he was incarcerated on child abuse charges. Smith subsequently entered a no
contest plea to one count of child abuse resulting in substantial bodily harm and was sentenced to
prison. As agreed, after Smith was sentenced to prison, DDS returned legal and physical custody
of the infant to Smith’s wife. Smith filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus
alleging he should be allowed to withdraw his plea as it was coerced and involuntary. The
district court granted the petition and the State of Nevada (“the State”) appealed.
Discussion
On appeal, the State first contended the district court ignored important facts pertaining to
Smith’s behavior and compliance with DSS. The Court held that the identifying and weighing of
facts is a province of the district court2 and there is nothing in the record to suggest the district
court ignored the evidence presented to it.
The State further argued the plea was not coerced because it was motivated by a desire to
avoid a more serious consequence. The Court dismissed this argument finding Smith did not
enter the plea to avoid a greater charge and the plea was motivated by the unique circumstances
of DDS’s position on the family court case.
Lastly, citing Iaea3, the State argued nothing about DSS’s actions were unconstitutional,
and constitutional, lawful actions of an agency cannot amount to coercion. The Court, relying
upon Iaea, found that the voluntariness of a plea in the context of coercion is based on the
totality of the circumstances. The Court explained the concern is not solely about the subjective
state of mind of the defendant, but also the “constitutional acceptability of the external forces
inducing the guilty plea.”4 Finding that external forces induced the plea does not relate to the
constitutionality of the external forces in isolation, but instead relates to whether the external
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forces deprived the plea of voluntariness. In finding the incarceration condition coercive, the
Court determined Iaea suggests that agency actions that may be lawful and constitutional, can
nevertheless be unduly coercive.
Conclusion
Even legal and constitutional actions, if unduly coercive, render a plea involuntary. Thus,
the district court’s finding that Smith’s incarceration condition proposed by DSS was unduly
coercive was not an abuse of discretion.
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